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I. INTRODUCTION
This paper seeks to examine both the theory and empirical evidence regarding 
complex issues of power, influence, and more specifically, leverage in the context of 
the relationship between small states^ and their arm suppliers. From Thucidides to 
Machiavelli to contemporary realists, power has been the pivotal concept in 
international relations theory. Power, influence, and leverage, however, are abstract 
concepts referring to complex phenomena that cannot be easily defined or 
circumscribed. Prolonged preoccupation with these concepts by philosophers, 
sociologists and political scientists has failed to produce commonly accepted 
definitions. Still, we have to clarify these concepts before we can hope to study them 
empirically, as it is impossible to study a phenomenon and make a case for its absence 
or presence in a given situation without first specifying what it is. Thus, we shall deal 
at the outset with the development of working definitions of the concepts of power, 
influence and leverage. This shall be done on the basis of what Dorwin Cartwright has 
called an "inverse Gresham's Law," namely, that definitions are retained or rejected 
based on their ability to lend coherence and consistency to research efforts that employ 
them.
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n. POWER, INFLUENCE, LEVERAGE: SOME THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Much of the existing literature on power can be conveniently summarized as 
dealing with it as either control over resources,4 over actors,5 or over outcomes.6 The 
concept of power as control over resources assumes that capabilities can be treated as 
being homogeneous, in an analogy with money, since the possession of a single means 
(power) can be employed for a variety of purposes. For political realists like Wolfers, ". 
. . power and influence play the same role in international politics as money does in the 
market economy" — the so-called "fungibility assumption." This approach to power, 
however, is problematic, because it suggests that control over resources can be 
efficiently translated into control over actors and outcomes, which quite frequently 
may not be the case. As David Bal win puts it, "if there were some generalized means 
of exercising power—just as money is a generalized means of exercising purchasing 
power—the problem of conceiving and measuring political power would have been 
simpler." Political power resources, however, tend to be less liquid than economic 
resources.1® In short, this approach is not useful for the purpose of this paper, because 
it fails to take into account the "conversion process"11 that is necessary if control over 
resources is to bring leverage in a given situation.
Defining power as control over outcomes (power as reflected in the distribution 
of gain and losses to actors in outcomes of events in which they participate), however, 
is no less problematic. This approach is based on the assumption that power is 
exercised exclusively for the actors own benefit. In cases of altruistic exercise of 
power on behalf of powerless actors, one might then come to the wrong conclusions 
regarding the actual power relations.
Furthermore, this approach assumes that outcomes are shaped mainly by the 
actions of the actors. Thus, it fails to consider the impact of structures in determining 
outcomes, aside from the intention of the actors. However, as Waltz has aptly
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reinarked, it is important to ask ”how and to what extent the structure of the realm 
accounts for outcomes and how and to what extent the units (actors) account for 
13 ...outcomes." According to him, "structures have to be studied in their own right as do 
units . . . Failure to mark and preserve the distinction between structure, on the one 
hand, and units and processes, on the other, makes it impossible to disentangle causes of 
different sorts and to distinguish between causes and effects."14 In sum, to define 
power as control over outcomes is problematic for our purposes, since it fails to 
consider the impact of structures, altruistic behavior, and random factors, and is unable 
to establish a casual link between resources, actions and outcome.
The third approach to power is more promising for our purpose here. It views 
power as control over actors, namely the capacity to impose one's will on others. This 
conception of power captures the essence of influence since it sees power as resting in 
the social relations between actors, and more specifically in the process by which one is 
able to make others conform to his will despite their possible resistance or indifference. 
Influence of others' behavior is based on both positive and negative inducements, and 
may be of either general or specific nature, i.e. circumscribed in time, place, issue­
area, etc. Leverage, we would contend, is but one sub-category of influence. Leverage 
is defined as "manipulation of a relationship in order to coerce or induce a recipient 
state to conform its policy or actions to the desire of the supplier state."15 It is usually 
aimed only at a specific issue or set of issues. Even more importantly, it emanates only 
from the threat, use, or anticipation of use of negative incentives for compliance, 
namely the withholding of any regularly supplied good or service.
Ongoing supply of goods and services (e.g. foreign economic and military aid, arms 
sales, etc.) creates the conditions in which leverage (the threat of withholding) can be 
exercised. Thus the supply relationship may also be viewed by the recipients as 
negative sanctions in disguise and a cause for apprehension, rather than as positive 
sanctions (and therefore, an innocent instrument of influence), which is the way the 
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providers of aid would like to think of it. As David Baldwin puts it "explanations of 
power relations should specify from whose point the situation is being viewed. In a 
given power relationship A may perceive himself as employing carrots, while B may 
perceive A as using sticks. Although many Americans perceive their foreign aid
16 programs in terms of positive sanctions, many participants perceive it differently."
Finally, leverage and influence have in common two additional characteristics 
that are worth noting in this context. Both are a matter of degree and both may or may 
not be coercive. Whether leverage or influence are coercive depends not so much on 
the means employed to attain compliance as on the degree of resistance by the target 
to that course of action. This is the case because coercion, strictly defined, refers to 
an attempt to overcome resistance. Thus, both leverage and influence are coercive 
to the extent that they try to elicit from the target behavior to which he is opposed, 
not merely indifferent or, indeed, supportive.
Having defined and somewhat clarified the concepts of power, influence and 
leverage, we now proceed to examine the relationship between arms transfers and 
leverage. Specifically we would like to explore the kind and degree of leverage that 
arms suppliers enjoy over their small states customers, leverage that ultimately rests 
on anticipation, threat or use of arms embargoes. We are, therefore, interested in 
assessing the vulnerability of small states to coercive leverage that arises from their 
dependence on foreign sources for the supply of their weapons. We also intend to 
examine the alternatives open to small states to compliance with the will of foreign 
arms suppliers. While there are, no doubt, other determinants of leverage aside from 
arms transfers, and arms transfers may also be a source of other forms of influence, 
these may be (for the purposes of this paper) impounded in a vast ceteris paribus upon 
which we shall not touch in this paper.
In the following sections two competing paradigms on arms transfers and leverage 
will be presented, the first derived from the writings on arms transfers, the second 
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from the literature on economic coercion. To evaluate the contrasting perspectives 
offered by these two paradigms we shall introduce a multidimensional framework for 
analysis based on social exchange theory, then follow it with an examination of the 
pertinent empirical evidence. We will conclude with some thoughts on the utility of 
each paradigm for understanding of leverage derived from arms dependence.
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m. THE ARMS TRANSFERS PERSPECTIVE
In recent years much has been written by academics (among others) on the arms 
requirements of small states, particularly in the Third World, and the ways in which 
they go about satisfying these requirements.
The motivating force behind most of the studies of arms transfers has been the 
conviction that some or all arms purchases by small developing countries are 
undesirable and the desire to find some way of controlling or limiting the spread of 
arms.18 Consequently, the literature has concerned itself almost exclusively with two 
broad issues: (1.) the motivation of major arms producers to transfer arms, and of small 
states to import them or produce them indigenously, and (2.) the political, military and 
economic consequences of arms production, transfer, and acquisition for both the 
supplier and recipient nations, as well as for the international (and regional) system. 
The relationship between the supplying and receiving nations, and particularly the 
dependence created and leverage enjoyed by the former over the latter have been 
discussed in the literature primarily in the context of the motivation to supply/acquire 
arms. Limited systematic attention has been given to the actual dependence created 
and concomitant leverage enjoyed, and the discussion of these issues has largely been 
confined to some brief empirical observations and off-hand generalizations. Still, the 
traditional literature on arms transfers and small states does offer a coherent and 
widely shared view on the leverage that arms producers enjoy over their clients. Its 
almost unanimous view is that arms suppliers wield considerable leverage over their 
customers, particularly the small states.
This literature claims that arms and the global arms market have some unique 
characteristics that provide the basis for leverage of suppliers over recipients, namely:
1. Arms are a strategic commodity. In an anarchical international system based 
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on the "self-help" principle arms are essential for existence and lack any close 
substitutes (demand side) J9
202. The arms market is oligopolistic in nature, having only four major 
exporters (supply side) Political considerations (e.g. membership in a defense pact such 
as NATO and WTO) frequently restrict even further the already limited choice of arms 
suppliers.
3. Barriers to entry for new suppliers are believed to be very high in terms of 
capital, technology, and skilled manpower, not to mention stiff competition in 
marketing and the inherently lower reliability of new (and smaller) suppliers. Moreover, 
the establishment of an indigenous industry producing sophisticated systems in 
developing nations requires massive transfers of technology components from the 
established producers. It thus fails to eliminate the dependence on these suppliers, and 
may even reinforce it. At best, it may substitute one form of dependence with another
21(supply side).
4. The lack of universal standardization of weapons systems, particularly for 
sophisticated systems, and the sale of exactly such systems to small developing 
countries, make the latter highly dependent on the initial supplier for training, 
maintenance, support services, and spare parts throughout the lifespan of the weapon 
(provided the weapons are acquired for combat or combat readiness rather than merely 
for prestige). Under such conditions shifting suppliers is very costly, and not only 
during the transition period, since significant costs also are incurred in maintaining 
disparate equipment in the inventory. Moreover, shifting suppliers is time consuming, 
and entails considerable military and political risk (vulnerability) during the transition
22period (supply side).
5. Supply of weapons and particularly the accompanying training is said not only 
to create economies of regularity, but also vested interests in the political and military 
orientation toward the supply country. It has been claimed that "the political 
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orientation of an arms importing country may be deduced simply from the make of the
23weapons it imports". Such an orientation allegedly makes a political decision to shift 
suppliers very problematic.
Overall, the view of the traditional literature is that arms transfers to small 
states "create" dependence which "of course limits the freedom of recipients to change 
suppliers, to play off one supplier against another, and to resist the efforts of exporters 
to place conditions on or extract political reform from particular arms transfers and 
long-term arms transfer relationship." (Emphasis added)
Recent developments involving arms transfers to developing countries have begun 
to shake the confidence of some scholars in the hitherto unchallenged premise that 
arms dependence entails significant political vulnerability and provides the supplier
25 with considerable leverage over his client(s). The willingness of major arms 
producers to deviate from their traditional policy and provide their clients with top-of- 
the-line weapons systems, the Egyptian treatment of the Soviet Union (1972), and the 
failure of the U.S arms embargo in Turkey (1974) seemed particularly instructive in 
this respect.
On the more general level, many students of arms transfers have recently 
observed some important developments in the international system and particularly in 
the arms market that have significant bearing on the leverage enjoyed by arms suppliers 
over their customers: (1) the commercialization of arms sales owing to the growing 
dependence of weapon producers on exports of arms to offset balance of payment 
deficits, to provide employment, to reduce the cost of domestic arms purchases, to 
recoup research and development costs, to maintain the viability of indigenous arms 
industry, and to provide spin-offs for the rest of the economy; (2) the increased 
dependence of arms producers (particularly in the West) on oil imports from Third World 
countries, as well as on revenues from arms sales; and (3) the entry into the arms 
market of many new producers and the expansion, diversification and upgrading of 
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production by existing ones. All of these developments have significantly increased the 
competition between the arms exporter to the extent, some argue, of creating a buyer's 
market.26
These developments reduce, no doubt, the asymmetry in the dependence of arms 
recipients on arms suppliers in general, and on specific supplier countries in particular. 
Still, these developments did not take place in the abstract — other developments that 
have no less significance for the relationship between arms producing and receiving 
nations also have taken place in recent years. Moreover, there is no consensus among 
the scholars on the significance of the developments listed above. Some argue that the 
dependence relationship between suppliers and recipients has not vanished, but only
27 become more complicated and subtle. In any event, the developments noted above 
would seem to justify a systematic re-evaluation of the issue of leverage emanating 
from arms sales. Such an evaluation, however, is nowhere to be found in the arms 
transfers literature. This is painfully evident even in the most recent and highly
28 acclaimed discussion of the politics of arms sales by Andrew Pierre.
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IV. THE ECONOMIC COERCION PERSPECTIVE
In sharp contrast to the literature on arms transfers stand the writings on 
economic coercion that focus on the leverage emanting from control of something of 
economic value. These writings have but little faith in economic coercion as an 
instrument of foreign policy in issues of high policy, thus suggesting that only little 
leverage would arise from arms sales. Let us briefly review the part of literature on 
economic coercion that bears upon our theoretical concerns and provides the reasoning 
behind these conclusions and expectations.
The study of economic coercion may have found its first systematic expression in 
Hirschman's classic National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade written in the 
29early 1940s. Since then, students of economic coercion have been able to go well 
beyond Hirschman's initial formulation of the "power policy using foreign trade as an
30 instrument" and "policies relying on the influence effect of foreign trade." These 
students and particularly Galtung,31 Knorr,32 Gilpin 33 Doxey 34 Jentleson,35
3fi 37 oo 3QHoffman, Walensteen, Losman, and Adler-Karlsson have been able to identify 
several conditions that are required for economic coercion to be effective, the most 
important of which are control over supply, inelasticity of demand, and cost of defiance 
in excess of the cost of compliance.
The studies of economic coercion have also addressed the question of the 
likelihood of success of attempts at economic coercion in the current international 
system. Initially, at least, the literature suggested almost unanimously and quite 
categorically that the conditions for success are not commonly found in the current 
international system and economic coercion therefore can be expected to fail in all but 
40the most extraordinary circumstances. More recently, however, a more sophisticated 
and discriminatory answer to this question has emerged in the literature. It suggests 
that assessment of the likelihood of success of economic coercion must take into 
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account not only the systemic conditions but also the target state's cost ratio for 
defiance versus compliance. This school of thought led by Klaus Knorr agrees that it is 
indeed extraordinarily rare for any one country to possess very high control over things 
of economic value. Its adherents also believe that it is highly improbable that those 
who possess a control over supply of a good or service will agree to the use of such 
control for any purpose other than derivation of monopolistic profit. Nonetheless, 
Knorr and his followers are convinced that even under these circumstances the cost of 
defiance may be sufficiently high or, alternatively, the cost of compliance sufficiently 
low, to favor success of economic coercion. Here is where the distinction between 
41application of coercion in high and low policy is introduced.
Application of coercion in low policy issues, according to Knorr, does not attract 
much public attention, and affects few if any of the vital interests of the target state. 
Consequently, the cost of compliance is not very high, resistance to the economic 
pressure by the target states is not very likely, and success of the coercion attempt is 
therefore at least possible, if not altogether probable. By contrast application of 
coercion in matters of high policy occurs across issue areas (the expected payoff is not 
solely economic), involves high stakes to the target state, arouses a great deal of 
publicity and is, therefore, characterized by a high cost of compliance. The high cost 
of compliance, in turn, induces fierce resistance by the target state and is likely to 
contribute to failure of coercive attempts.
The empirical evidence uncovered to date indeed seems to provide overwhelming 
support to the thesis that international economic coercion in matters of high policy is 
42all but doomed to failure. We have every reason to expect that these general findings 
concerning the efficacy of economic coercion in high policy issues should also hold true 
for the particular form of economic coercion based on arms dependence. This is the 
case not only because such coercion affects and attempts to influence high policy 
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issues, but also because arms acquisition—in and of itself—is a matter of high policy for 
practically every country.
By now it should be clear that the writings on arms transfers and economic 
coercion offer two sharply contrasting views on the issue of leverage emanating from 
arms sales. In order to resolve this ambivalence, improve our understanding of the 
issue, and bridge the gap between the two paradigms, we should establish an 
independent framework for analysis, then proceed to use it for testing the opposing 
claims and reviewing the empirical evidence. It is to this task that we now turn.
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V. A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSE: SOCIAL EXCHANGE THEORY
The threat or capacity to withhold or deny any regularly supplied good or service 
is, as we have argued earlier, the essence of leverage. The existence of trade 
(exchange)*  between actors, and the capacity of one to deny the other a good or 
service, is necessary but insufficient to endow him with leverage over the other. 
Presence of other favorable conditions, at the bilateral system, and unit levels, is also 
necessary for the purpose. Let us first examine the conditions that must be met before 
trade (exchange) in general can become a potent lever, then proceed to determine the 
presence or absence of these conditions in the specific context of arms transfers.
*
For the purpose of this paper trade is considered to be in existence even if actual 
transactions have not yet taken place, provided the commitments to supply and receive 
have already been made and integrated into the planning and expectation of the 
partners.
A bilateral exchange relationship is, broadly speaking, one of mutual dependence 
or interdependence, since each party to the exchange is sensitive to and affected by 
actions taken by the other(s). This mutual sensitivity of interdependent relations is 
believed to be important as a source of influence and leverage primarily when it is 
imbalanced or asymmetrical, namely when there is a sufficient variation between the 
parties in the degree of their indifference to the rewards of the exchange. To quote 
Keohane and Nye, "it is the asymmetries in dependence that are most likely to provide 
43sources of influence for actors in the dealing with one another." Peter Blau 
expressed the same idea fifteen years earlier when he wrote that "interdependence and 
mutual influence of equal strength indicate lack of power."44 In trade relations such 
asymmetrical interdependence arises primarily from variations in the levels of trade 
concentrations as well as commodity concentration between the trading parties.
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Thus far we have discussed only one dimension of interdependent relations — 
mutual sensitivities — where sensitivity refers to the costs that one party to the 
interdependent relations has to bear owing to changes that take place in the other 
before the first party changes any of his policies. Asymmetry in sensitivities 
between trading parties, as we have explained above, is to a large degree a function of 
the conditions prevailing between and within the trading units. As such it can prove an 
important source of influence. But interdependent relations have one additional 
dimension — mutual vulnerabilities — where vulnerability refers to the cost incurred by 
one partner to the exchange owing to changes that take place in the other after the
A A first has already altered (adjusted) his policies. Asymmetrical vulnerability turns out 
to be the crucial condition for leverage because it also reflects asymmetry in the 
relative availability and costliness of the alternatives the various actors have.47 
Vulnerability, however, does not necessarily correspond with sensitivity (and asymmetry 
in one does not, therefore, automatically translate into asymmetry in the other), and it 
is shaped not only by bilateral and unit (country) level conditions but also, and even 
primarily, by systemic ones (e.g. the nature of the global market for the good or service
48under discussion). Consequently, we must also consider the systemic conditions in our 
analysis of leverage.
As the above discussion suggests, comprehensive and systematic assessment of 
leverage emanating from trade (exchange) relationship should consider conditions at the 
unit, bilateral, and system level. Social exchange theory, and more specifically Peter 
Blau's work provides us with a framework for analysis of vulnerability and therefore, 
leverage. It stands in sharp contrast to the traditional arms transfers literature, which 
focuses primarily, if not solely, on bilateral and unit level conditions. Blau's framework 
(see below) suggests itself as most useful for the type of analysis carried out in this 
paper for at least one additional reason. It provides a parsimonious and exhaustive 
conceptualization of power, one that links its manifestations (influence and leverage) to 
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social exchange (i.e. trade relations).50 In the process it illuminates the tactical 
courses of action that may be pursued by trade partners to diminish influence and
51leverage of others and to enhance their own influence/leverage over others.
Some readers may wish to raise the standard criticism directed at social exchange 
theory, namely that its key assumption of egotistical and self-centered behavior by
CO
actors is normatively biased and unrealistic. But we consider this assumption, which
53 social exchange has in common with utilitarian and classicial economic theories, as 
both appropriate and informative for the analysis of international politics in view of the 
semi-anarchical nature of the international system.
The framework for analysis of power (leverage) relationships suggested by Peter 
Blau, derives in part from an earlier work by Richard Emerson54. it can be easily 
operationalized. According to Blau, in order to achieve power over others, four 
conditions have to be met (see Table 1):
(1) one must remain indifferent to what others offer, (2) one must have a monopoly over 
what others need, (3) law and order must prevail, and (4) materialistic and other 
relevant values have to be deep rooted. Conversely defiance, according to Blau, 
requires that one possess one or more of the following options: one should be able to (1) 
provide inducement to the supplier, (2) obtain elsewhere, (3) take by force, and (4) do 
without.
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Table 1: Requirements for Power and Alternatives to Compliance
Requirements of Power Alternative to Compliance
Indifference to what others offer
Monopoly over what others need
Law and order
Materialistic and other relevant values
Supply inducements
Obtain elsewhere
Take by force
Do without
Source: Adapted from Peter Blau, Exhange and Power in Social Life, (New York: John 
Wiley and Son, 1964), p. 124.
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VI. THE EXERCISE OF LEVERAGE: SYSTEM LEVEL CONDITIONS
Let us now turn to the specific context of arms transfers, and examine the 
leverage of arms producers over their small state clients in light of the requirements 
postulated above.
1. Indifference to what others offer (versus supply incentives)
Indifference of a supplier to what others have to offer is an obvious source of 
power, for it satisfies one of the conditions for asymmetry of dependence relations. If, 
however, a supplier is attracted to what his client has to offer the relationship becomes 
one of reciprocal exchange and approximates symmetrical dependence.
Both the traditional arms suppliers and certainly the newer ones have become, 
over the years, increasingly receptive to the supply incentives that arms customers 
have to offer. These incentives take the form of monetary rewards, oil and other raw 
materials, military bases, markets for manufactured goods, and/or political cooperation 
and support. In recent years producers have been relying increasingly (and explicitly)^ 
on arms exports to secure their supply of oil. Other goals include improvement in 
balance of payments, hard currency earnings and employment; recovery of R<5cD costs; 
maintaining the viability of indigenous arms industry; and enhanced political support 
and influence. True, significant differences clearly exist between (and within) arms 
producing nations in the level and type of dependence on arms exports as well as in the 
sensitivity to supply incentives. There are also some short term variations (and even 
reversals) in these levels of dependence and sensitivity. Still, the long term trend is 
clearly toward diminished asymmetry of dependence in the relationship between arms 
producers and consumers, a trend that is quite apparent when one compares the current 
state of affairs to that which prevailed in the late 1960's and early 1970's. All other 
things being equal, this trend would imply that the leverage arising from weapon sales is 
being undercut.
-18-
Perhaps the most striking example of this trend is the PRC's arms sales policy. 
Following Mao's death, the PRC has identified an urgent need for economic 
modernization in general, and modernization of its arms arsenal in particular. To 
satisfy these needs, however, the Chinese required both foreign currency and modern 
military technology, both of which were rather scarce commodities in China. To obtain 
both commodities, the Chinese drastically modified their traditionally restrictive and 
ideologically motivated arms sales policy. They have not only increased expotentially 
the volume of their arms sales56, but have also diversified their customers, to the 
point where they now sell military hardware to two combatants, Iran (through South
57Korea), and Iraq (through Egypt).
2. Control of what others need (versus alternative sources of supply)
Tight control over supply of goods and services valued by others is clearly 
essential for economic leverage. Such control is possible through monopoly over 
production or marketing, or alternatively through cooperation (voluntary or involuntary) 
of other producers. Conversely, for defiance to become a viable strategy it is essential 
for the consumer to be able to obtain his needs from more than one foreign source.
While monopoly in arms production has not existed in the past few decades, the 
arms market has had a tight oligopolistic structure with only four major producers, two 
of which (the superpowers) were much larger than the others and were, in some cases, 
the only producers of some advanced and complex systems. Little cooperation or 
coordination, however, has been achieved between the major arms producers with 
respect to their conventional arms transfers policies. In fact, their relationship in this 
sphere has largely been characterized by competition rather than cooperation, 
something that has become increasingly evident in recent years. One facet of this 
growing competition between the arms producers has been their growing willingness to 
forego the qualitative and quantitative restrictions on sale and conditions on use that 
they have traditionally imposed on their arms transfers to Third World countries. This 
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change has drastically altered the supply conditions in the global arms market, and has 
been quickly reflected in the type, quantity, and quality of weapons actually purchased 
by small states, particularly in the Third World.
Small states have been quick to exploit for their own advantage the new supply 
conditions in the arms market. With increasing frequency they now play one supplier 
against another in order to achieve one or more of four major objectives: (a) to 
improve the financial terms of the deal, (b) to increase the share of the weapon 
system(s) that will be produced, or at least assembled in the recipient country, (c) to 
obtain weapon systems or components that would not otherwise be sold, (d) to remove 
or avoid restricitons on the future use of the weapon system purchased. Two recent 
examples will serve to illustrate these points.
During the negotiations for the sale of AWACS planes between the U.S. and Saudi 
Arabia in the late 1970s, the Saudis repeatedly used the threat of a purchase of a 
similar system from Britain and France (which were more than eager to sell to the 
Saudis) to convince the American administration and dissuade the Congressional 
opponents of the deal from cancelling it or imposing unacceptable conditions on the 
planes' use. The administration itself has used this line of argument in its attempt to 
overcome the opposition to the deal. Furthermore, following the approval of the deal 
and during a subsequent visit to Saudi Arabia by the U.S. Secretary of Defense, which 
was designed to conclude the negotiations for the use of the AWACS planes, the Saudis 
refused to grant the U.S. access to its installations (for the Rapid Deployment Force) 
and maintained that they could do with their American arms as they pleased since they 
paid for them in cash. "You are just arms salesmen", said a Saudi general, "and we pay 
cash."58
The Saudi general's remark captures one additional feature of the current arms 
market related to our earlier discussion. Unlike the 1950's and 1960's when most arms 
transfers to Third World countries provided for discounts, easy credit or barter, and in 
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some cases were done as outright grants, a higher percentage of the more recent 
transfers were straightforward sales paid for in cash.59 s *»h  deals clearly provide the 
supplier with a much smaller lever over his customer.
In 1980 Jordan decided to purchase a mobile SAM-6 system from the Soviet Union 
after it was denied a similar system by the U.S. Since then, the U.S. has made several 
attempts to convince the Jordanians to cancel the deal with the Soviets in return for 
which the U.S. will supply them with an improved mobile Hawk system (which will not 
be subject to the restrictions on use and deployment imposed by the Senate on the 
earlier Hawk system purchased by Jordan in 1976). This case, therefore, clearly 
underlines the improved bargaining position of developing small states vis a vis the 
major arms suppliers. The U.S. Secretary of Defense upon his return from Jordan 
acknowledged this state of affairs, when, in an attempt to win support for the sale of 
the mobile Hawk system, he stated that, "Jordan will buy a mobile air-defense system— 
the question is from whom."60
The competition between the major traditional suppliers of arms has been further 
intensified by entry into the market of many new producers/exporters (see Table 2) and 
the expansion, diversification and upgrading of production and sales by existing ones 
(see Tables 3.1 and 3.2). The number of producers/exporters of second echelon arms 
systems has grown dramatically over the last decade with the number of suppliers of 
more sophisticated systems also growing, but at a much slower pace. The entry into the 
arms market of these new producers has also been significant in one other important 
respect. By virtue of their greater dependence on arms exports to generate income and 
maintain the viability of their indigenous arms industry, these new producers are much 
less likely to impose embargoes and subject their arms sales and deliveries to other 
forms of political interruptions, and are, therefore, much more reliable suppliers. Thus, 
for example, during the Falkland Island Crisis, Israel resisted strong British pressures to 
curtail the supply of weapons to Argentina under existing contracts.
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Table 2: Emergence of New Arms Exporters, 1970-1979
Exporting Country
Value of
Exports 
1970
Value of
Exports 
1979
Average Annual
Exports
1970-74
Average Annual
Exports
1975-79
Argentina 0 9 5.8 2.8
Australia 0 27 16.1 62.2
Austria 0 91 7.0 91.6
Brazil 0 55 0 60.2
Bulgaria 0 45 9.2 34.2
Finland 0 73 0 14.6
Greece 0 4 0 2.8
Hungary 0 9 8.6 17.0
Libya 0 82 1.4 23.8
North Korea 0 73 0 57.0
Norway 0 45 16.4 28.2
Pakistan 0 4 0 9.0
Portugal 0 18 1.4 25.2
Rumania 0 64 36.4 46.6
Saudi Arabia 0 229 1.2 56.0
Singapore 0 9 3.0 10.4
South Africa 0 55 2.8 23.6
South Korea 0 165 0 70.6
Source: Calculated from ACDA World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1970- 
1979, Table II. Figures are in constant million U.S. dollars (1978).
Comments: 1. Since ACDA's arms exports statistics include only weapons already 
delivered, they tend to downplay the full magnitude of the expansion of arms sales by 
the new exporters during the 1970's. Nevertheless, notice the sharp increase in arms 
sales by these countries in the second half of the decade as compared to the first half.
2. The list includes arms exports based on indigenous production as well as re­
exportation of systems imported by these countries. In both cases the exporting 
country is a source for supply of weapons.
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The proliferation of conventional arms sales, particularly to the Third World, and 
the global spread of weapons assembly and production facilities have also substantially 
increased the number of potential sources of spare parts for most weapon systems in 
the arsenal of small states. These developments have made small states significantly 
less dependent for spare parts on the original supplier of the weapon system, thereby 
undermining one of the most critical and sensitive sources of dependence and 
vulnerability. Several recent historical episodes could illustrate these points.
Following the 1967 French arms embargo, Israel managed to obtain some parts for 
its French built systems (and particularly the Mirage planes) from Holland and other 
foreign sources, while it produced others indigenously. After severing its ties with the 
Soviet Union in the mid-1970's, Egypt succeeded in getting from China parts for its 
MiG's and other Soviet-built weapons systems, and later replaced key components in 
these systems (e.g. jet and tank engines) with superior Western equivalents. Turkey 
withstood fairly well a U.S. arms embargo during the same period, obtaining spare parts 
for its U.S. made weapons and new weapon systems from several NATO countries, 
particularly FRG and Italy. The Iranians have also been able to overcome a U.S. arms 
embargo during and after the "hostage crisis". They purchased parts for their 
American-built systems from a whole array of foreign sources, which apparently 
included Israel, Italy, Greece, Spain, North and South Korea, and Vietnam. Most 
recently, during the Falkland Island crisis, Argentina has apparently overcome an EEC 
arms embargo by acquiring the parts and supplies for its air force from other Latin 
American countries (Venezuela and Peru) as well as Libya and Israel.
Small states are thus able to obtain spare parts for existing weapons systems as 
well as brand new systems from several foreign suppliers, which often compete to sell 
the weapons. The establishment and growth of indigenous arms industries in the small 
states has opened for them another source for supply of arms, one which seems 
politically superior to any other source. These indigenous industries clearly fall short of
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providing their countries with complete self-sufficiency in arms, and they also create 
some new forms of foreign dependence (e.g. on foreign technological assistance and 
component(s)), particularly when complex and sophisticated systems are concerned. 
Nevertheless, they significantly reduce the overall dependence of the country on arms 
imports and create a form of dependence that is much less politically inhibiting, 
certainly in the short run, since the need for the foreign assistance is far less urgent in 
nature.
3. Law and order (versus application of force and coercion)
Unlike domestic systems that are centralized and hierarchic, the international 
system is semi-anarchic and decentralized.^! Whereas domestic systems possess 
coercive instruments to enforce law and order, the functional equivalent of law and 
order at the international level is certain rules that are recognized by states. These 
rules range from simple tacit understanding (e.g. spheres of influence) to the elaborate 
codification of rules governing international commerce, technical cooperation, etc.
Small states have traditionally supported international law and norms because 
they benefit from the formal equity, the predictability of behavior, and the limitation 
on the freedom of action of major powers that law provides. To reap these benefits, 
small states themselves have to behave in accordance with international law and norms 
in interstate relations, and indeed their behavior in the field of weapons procurement 
has been traditionally characterized by conformity to international law. This is the 
case not only because of the general advantages that adherence to law provides, but 
also because illegal behavior is not a viable long-term strategy for weapons acquisition.
Actual use of force by a small state against a weapon producer is clearly 
ineffective to guarantee a supply of weapons over the long-run, and even under the best 
of circumstances it can only relieve or ease some short-term supply problem (e.g. the 
missile boats which Israel smuggled out of Cherbourg Harbor in France in the late 
1960's). Application of other forms of coercion against arms producers is only slightly 
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more viable as a strategy for weapons acquisition by small states, since it is necessarily 
confined to only few such countries which enjoy a unique international position (e.g. 
Saudi Arabia), and even this unique position may not be long-lasting. Moreover, the 
application of force and coercion by small states against the major arms producers may 
be a more effective strategy for denying weapons to others than for obtaining them for 
oneself. Finally, it should be noted that in the few cases that small states have not 
abided by the law in their relations with their major arms suppliers (e.g. 1979 Iranian 
hostage taking), the illegal actions were not primarily motivated by the desire to obtain 
weapons.
4. Materialistic and other relevant values (versus do without)
A state's demand for weapons is shaped by two analytically separate but 
empirically interrelated factors—the external environment and the domestic conditions. 
The external environment has three different dimensions that affect the demand for 
weapons: the nature of the international system, the character of the regional sub­
systems, and the actions of other national units. It is only because of certain features 
of the current international system, however, that the other two dimensions assume any 
significance. These features of the international system are its decentralized and semi- 
anarchic nature and the lack of any central authority or any effective regulatory, 
allocative, and obligative mechanisms. Order in the system is maintained on the basis 
of the self-help principle. The nature of the system creates for states a basic security 
dilemma, which is reflected in and exacerbated by developments within the regions and 
their other national units. States attempt to resolve the security dilemma, at least in 
part, by maintaining their own instruments of violence, which requires, in turn, 
acquisition of arms.
Domestic factors provide additional stimulus for procurement of arms. These 
factors include, among others, domestic instability, bureaucratic politics, and pursuit of 
prestige for the state and its leadership. Domestic stimulus for arms acquisition 
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assumes particularly great significance in small non-European states where the 
leadership faces the difficult task of stabilizing the regime internally, as well as 
protecting the state's sovereignty and enhancing its prestige internationally. These 
tasks mandate the acquisition of at least some weapons to secure for the regime the 
support of the military as well as to facilitate effective suppression of domestic and 
foreign opposition.
Thus, for a whole array of internal and external factors, military as well as 
political, disarmament (and certainly unilateral disarmament) is hardly a viable strategy 
for states in general, and small states in particular. This fact is indeed reflected in the
63arms transfer statistics of the last decade, which show that small states have 
developed an almost insatiable demand for weapons. While it may be possible for these 
states to do without additional weapons for a while as a temporary solution to a supply 
problem — until a new source of supply is found and/or developed — it is practically 
inconceivable that any of them would be either willing or able to forego new weapon 
acquisitions for a prolonged period. In this sense, the basic demand for weapons is both 
high and sustained. While such demand pattern is clearly significant in shaping the 
global arms market, it only becomes politically meaningful in terms of creation of 
dependence and a base for leverage under certain supply conditions (see below).
Balance Sheet
Since the basic demand for arms by small states/Third World countries is both 
high and sustained, the issue of whether such demands for arms creates politically 
significant leverage for suppliers over recipients hinges on the answers to two 
questions: (1) Is there more than one independent source of supply and (2) can the 
clients provide the producers with sufficient incentives (in the form of carrots and/or 
sticks) to insure supply. Both of these conditions have to exist for defiance to become a 
viable strategy for an arms recipient. On the other hand the absence of merely one of 
them may suffice to provide considerable leverage to an arms producer.
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As the preceding analysis should have made clear, the answers to these questions 
are not categorical and absolute but rather judgmental and a matter of degree. 
Moreover, these answers may have to be more discriminatory, taking account of the 
variance in the position of the various countries within the small states/Third World 
group. This will be done, in part, in the next section of this paper, which shifts the 
analysis to the unit level. Nonetheless, it is our judgement, on the basis of the 
structural analysis provided above, that the general answer to both questions has clearly 
become yes. Consequently, we believe that overall the leverage provided by arms sales 
to arms producers has gone through a period of marked decline, a trend, we would 
argue, that is likely to continue in the foreseeable future. In fact, it may even be the 
case today that while the transfer of arms does not provide the supplier with much in 
the way of leverage, his refusal to supply may seriously undermine his position and 
influence.
Our conclusions are based on the observation that the changes that have taken 
place in the relevant variables (outlined in Blau's framework) point almost unanimously 
in the same direction—towards a weaker bargaining position of the arms suppliers. 
Global expansion and diversification of arms production and emergence of new 
producers have loosened the control of any individual supplier over the market, more 
than offsetting in the process the rise in demand for arms. Growing sensitivity of arms 
producers to supply incentives, coupled with their mounting dependence on arms 
exports, have intensified the competition between the major arms suppliers almost to 
the point of creating a buyers' market. A quantitative as well as qualitative 
proliferation of conventional arms transfers, which followed both of these 
developments, has rapidly increased the number of available sources not only for new 
weapon systems but also for spare parts, thereby weakening the "addictive effects" of 
arms sales.
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VH. THE EXERCISE OF LEVERAGE: UNIT LEVEL CONDITIONS
Thus far we have discussed the structure of the international system, the global 
arms market, and their implications for the leverage that arms suppliers may enjoy over 
their small states recipients. To complete our analysis we must supplement the 
discussion of the systemic conditions with an examination of factors operating within 
both arms supplying and receiving nations, as these may affect the dependence (and 
therefore also the leverage) equation in several important ways.64 initially, we shall 
consider some factors operating on the supplier side of the equation that may impede 
his capacity to exploit arms exports for coercive leverage in foreign policy. We shall 
then turn to the recipient side of the equation and explore some domestic conditions 
and government policies in small states that influence their dependence on foreign 
sources of arms and their vulnerability to pressure from their arms suppliers.
It is well established in the literature that governments' freedom of action can be 
restricted by internal as well as external constraints. Much has been written in this 
context on the constraints on leverage that emanate from the interrelation between 
domestic and foreign policy objectives, as well as between foreign policy objectives 
themselves.65 Here we shall focus on the impact of other internal constraints, namely 
domestic structures, on leverage. These can be clearly understood if we look at the 
strength of the state in relation to its domestic society. In this respect, the power of 
the state vis a vis its own society can be seen along a spectrum ranging from weak to 
strong.66
In societies with a strong state (or state-centered policy networks), policy 
formulation corresponds to the model of unitary government. Its unitary character 
permits the government to impose its policy preferences on the country as a whole over 
the objections of interest groups. Conversely, in societies with relatively weak states, 
policy networks correspond to a model of pluralistic government. Power is divided and 
fragmented, and authority concentrated in automonous and semi-autonomous agencies, 
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which are frequently captured by different interests.^7 Consequently, interest groups 
are able to veto and circumvent policy decisions and even control the policy-making in 
certain issue areas.
Thus a weak state (and a strong society) in a weapons-producing country (e.g. the 
U.S.)68 seriously undermines the leverage it could otherwise possess vis a vis the 
foreign arms recipients because it lacks sufficient control over the resources necessary 
for exercise of leverage. In such countries, interest groups, such as large corporations, 
foreign lobby groups, labor unions, etc., which have vested interest in arms exports and 
exercise considerable influence over the administration, may pressure it to sell arms 
beyond what is perceived to be in the national interest. The interest groups may even 
circumvent decisions of the administration not to sell or to ban sales by selling arms 
through third parties. Furthermore, disagreements over arms sales policies are also 
possible within the state itself. Such disagreements, whether between different 
branches of government (e.g. the executive versus the legislative) or between different 
government departments (e.g. State versus Defense), further weaken the bargaining 
position of the state vis a vis the recipient country. Lack of cohesion within the U.S. 
government, for example, was instrumental in reducing the efficacy of the arms 
embargo imposed on Turkey (1975) following its invasion of Cyprus.
Domestic conditions and government policies are therefore important in shaping 
arms exports and putting them to a coercive use in foreign policy. They are as 
important, if not more so, in shaping the dependence of small states on arms imports, 
their vulnerability to suppliers' pressures based on such dependence, and their capacity 
to withstand/resist such pressures. In this context, it is useful to assess the impact of 
these domestic factors by considering a set of alternative courses of action for 
acquiring arms that small states may in theory pursue to ease their security dilemma.
For small states to obtain the weapons required (or perceived to be required) for 
their defense usually means purchasing them abroad. At the same time, however, these 
states are extremely reluctant to incur the political, military, or economic vulnerability 
-31-
that dependence on foreign weapon suppliers may entail. Minimizing this vulnerability 
requires, among other things, reducing the asymmetry in their relations with their 
foreign weapon suppliers. Theoretically there are two ways by which these states can 
reduce this asymmetry without jeopardizing the supply of weapons to their defense 
establishment: (1) by increasing also the dependence of their weapon suppliers on them 
— providing these suppliers with their strategic resources — the desired outcome in this 
case is a more symmetrical interdependence; and (2) by reducing their dependence on 
any single foreign supplier of arms (and on foreign suppliers as a whole) by diversifying 
sources of supply, producing indigenously, and reducing their overall demand for 
weapons or for certain particular systems, etc. In the latter case the desired outcome 
is lower dependence.
The two courses of action discussed above differ in many respects, the primary 
difference being, perhaps, that the former increases the small state sensitivity 
interdependence while the latter diminishes it. Both, however, provide the small states 
with greater leeway, freedom of maneuver, etc. and in this sense both increase the
♦
small state's independence. That is, if we perceive the relationship between 
dependence and independence as a graduated and complex continuum ranging from 
complete independence on the one pole to complete dependence on the other, we can 
argue that both courses of action push small states closer to the independence pole.
Social exchange theory approaches the dependence/independence continuum as a 
set of alternatives the presence (or absence) of which determines the independence 
(dependence) of any one actor on another for certain goods or services.69 These
♦Independence can be operationally defined with respect to a specified set of 
objectives and considered to be a matter of degree. A state is said to be completely 
independent to the extent that its goal (or a set of goals) can be reached without resort 
to instrumentalities under the control of another state. Any recourse to the resources 
or cooperation or both of others entails a certain degree of dependence. 
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four conditions for independence are, according to Blau: (1) strategic resources; 
(2) available alternatives; (3) coercive force; (4) ideals lessening need. We would now 
like to consider the independence of small states in the sphere of weapons acquisition in 
light of these conditions.
1. Strategic Resources
Arms producers are motivated to engage in transfers to small states by two 
complementary clusters of factors: (1) perceptions that their support for small states 
will serve one or more of their global or domestic interests; and (2) desire to secure 
valuable resources that the small states can actually provide (or threaten to deny) 
them. The latter category is of particular concern to us here. As we have noted 
earlier, small states can provide arms producers with supply incentives in the form of 
monetary rewards, base rights, intelligence-gathering rights, scarce raw materials, 
political cooperation, combat experience for weapons systems, etc. Numerous 
historical examples are available for the exchange of strategic assets in return for 
arms. In the post-WWII period small states have consistently offered the major powers 
bases and other relevant rights of strategic importance in return for arms sales. 
Recently, Greece, Turkey, Spain, Phillipines, Somalia, and Oman have bargained with 
the U.S. for massive aid packages in return for basing privileges. Other countries like 
Egypt (1967-1973), Syria, Yugoslavia, and Morocco used the same quid pro quo to 
extract arms supplies from the Soviet Union.
To the traditional uses of basing facilities, a variety of relatively new 
technological functions have been added. These functions, such as electronic 
intelligence gathering as well as communications and surveillance, have created 
considerable demand for strategic access to the territory of others. Other important 
strategic resources for inducing suppliers to provide arms are combat performance data 
of weapon systems, captured weapon systems, and raw materials. As for the former, 
Israel has traditionally provided the U.S. captured Soviet weapon system, as well as 
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combat experience with American-made systems, in exchange for American military 
hardware and software. In regard to the other, oil has been the most frequently sought 
strategic resource in arms deals (e.g. Soviet arms transfers to Iraq, U.S. transfers to 
Saudi Arabia, French arms transfers to Libya, Iraq, and the Persian Gulf countries, etc.) 
Political cooperation may also become a valuable asset in the hands of small countries. 
Keohane, for example, has shown that "... lesser allies have not only been able to act 
independently; they also have been able to use alliances to influence American foreign 
policy and to alter American perspectives."?0
Small states can use the strategic resources at their disposal for both rewards and 
sanctions (actual or threatened). Both uses enhanced their bargaining position vis a vis 
the arms producers. Still, the possession of strategic resources is not automatically 
equivalent to influence, since certain other factors impinge on the translation of 
resources into influence. The intervening variables include, among others, the 
attributes of the state as well as systemic conditions. Certain attributes of small
71states such as the "intensity of interests" and "concentration on a small number of
72issues" as well as "greater cohesion" provide them with significant advantages in the 
process of political bargaining. Other factors such as systemic conditions and skill of 
negotiation do not necessarily favor the small state, at least not indiscriminately so. 
Evaluation of their impact, therefore, requires that we distinguish between the various 
types of strategic resources and also consider the conditions unique to each case, a task 
that lies outside the scope of this paper. Here we shall only attempt to evaluate the 
impact of systemic conditions on the capacity of small states to exchange political 
cooperation and bases for arms.
Are systemic conditions conducive for translating base rights into reverse 
influence? The existing literature offers some conflicting answers to this question. 
Handel, in particular, argues that the need of great powers to secure permanent 
presence in small states territory "has declined in the missile age because the value of
-34-
170 e e ...
such bases has depreciated."' This view, therefore, suggests that systemic conditions 
do not favor the small states, at least so far as base rights are concerned.
Two other views, however, came to the opposite conclusion by placing greater 
emphasis on other functions that bases perform. Kemp and Miller argue that "because 
intelligence-gathering is such a high priority activity and because the bases are very 
sensitively located and are thus harder to replace than other types of bases, the 
pressures on a supplier government to use whatever instruments necessary, including 
arms, to maintain its intelligence gathering facilities will become more intense."?4 
Certain technological developments in weaponry, coupled with limitations of 
reconnaisance satellites and resistance to on-site inspection, necessarily increase the 
importance of intelligence bases for verification purposes (by national technical means) 
even during a peaceful period of arms control negotiations/agreements.
R. Harkavy makes the same point with respect to the importance of bases, by 
looking at another function that bases perform, one of a traditional geopolitical nature. 
As he puts it:
"Resource shortages, both existing and expected—most notably in oil 
but involving numerous other commodities—have served to focus 
renewed attention on real or hypothetical requirements for 
protecting sea lanes and for controlling maritime checkpoints and on 
the importance of staging areas for military intervention 
contingences."75
The value of political cooperation of small states is similarly affected by systemic 
conditions Here, however, there is practically a consensus among the scholars that the 
value of such cooperation in the eyes of the superpowers increases substantially during 
periods of tension and global competition, not to say confrontation, between the 
superpowers. This held true for the bipolar system in the "cold war" era and also 
seems to be the case in the current period of faltering detente between the 
superpowers. In both of these periods the superpower have employed arms transfers as 
a foreign policy instrument designed to secure new political allies or maintain existing 
ones.
-35-
All in all, the conclusion seems to be that at least some forms of strategic 
resources have either been all along or "have become important tangible items of 
exchange, providing considerable leverage for smaller states in bargaining over military
77and economic aid."
2. Available alternatives
The availability of alternative sources from which a needed service can be 
obtained is a second condition for independence. In this respect, the systemic 
conditions seem to favor the independence of small states. As we have already argued 
above, the world market for arms has become highly competitive in recent years due 
both to the increase in the number of major weapons suppliers and their willingness, 
indeed eagerness, to sell arms This suggests that states have the following alternatives 
for weapons' acquisition: they may purchase weapons from one or several suppliers, and 
these may be located either domestically or abroad. Four primary strategies ("ideal 
types") for weapons procurement are therefore possible (see Table 4).
Each of these strategies entails costs and benefits of political, economic and 
military nature. The time frame also is important in considering the relative merits of 
each alternative, as short term benefits may offset long-term costs and vice versa. We 
turn now to a discussion of these strategies.
A. Indigenous Production (Strategy Types III, IV)
Strategy types III and IV emphasize domestic arms production. Both aim at 
autarky. By autarky, we mean complete independence of research, development, 
production and maintenance of all needed (desired) weapons systems. Strategy IV 
(diversification among domestic suppliers) in its "ideal" form, however, is hardly viable 
for small states, and we shall, therefore, focus on strategy III (total domestic 
concentration).
* Some very partial exceptions are provided by Israel and Sweden, which have in 
certain areas two or more indigenous products which are competing with each other.
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Table 4.: Strategies for Weapons Acquisition: Four "Ideal Types"
Number of Suppliers
One Several
Lo
ca
ti
on
 o
f 
Pr
od
uc
ti
on
Fo
re
ig
n Total Foreign 
Concentration
(Type I)
Diversification
Among Foreign 
Suppliers
(Type II)
Diversification
o Total Domestic Among Domestic
p OT Concentration Suppliers
<u
s
Q
(Type III) (Type IV)
/
-37-
The benefits of complete self-reliance in weapons acquisition are rather 
substantial.
— Indigenous arms production and maintenance promotes a nation's 
independence in pursuing policies, or at least confers on it a freedom of maneuver that 
will not be otherwise available. Hence, small states can use their weapons when, 
where, and how they want.
— Small states reduce the risk (and concomitant fear) of cutoffs, embargoes or 
slowdown in supply of new systems and spare parts whether deliberate or accidental.
— Some important channels of penetration by suppliers into the state and the 
society of "client" countries are blocked.
— Small states by virtue of designing and manufacturing their own weapon 
systems can maximize their fit to the specific military needs and the social, political, 
and economic conditions of the particular country, rather than to those of the supplying 
country, which is the case with imported arms.
— Indigenous arms production in a small state is also bound to be more sensitive 
to the priorities of production of the country's military. This factor assumes great 
significance during a time of crises when an indigenous arms industry is apt to respond 
to the urgent needs and adjust its production accordingly.
— Arms industry in a small state, particularly when it is partially or wholly 
government owned (which is usually the case), enables the country to maintain secret 
military R&D, production and acquisition, if it so desires.
— Arms production in a small developing country may have considerable 
domestic political significance as a source of national pride and manifestation of 
sovereignty, and it may even earn that country some prestige abroad.
— Production of arms in a small state may be an economically viable enterprise, 
particularly when the production is of weapons systems for which economies of scale 
are not critical. These may also be important spillover effects on the rest of the 
economy.78 While the domestic market is rather small for most military systems, 
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successful exports of such systems will provide the country with much needed revenues 
and hard currency, and may even reduce the actual cost of the systems purchased by its 
own military. The political reliability of small states as weapon suppliers only enhances 
their attractiveness and chances for success in exporting weapons.
— Arms industry in a small state may prevent a substantial "brain drain" and
79 may be used as a tool for regional development.
— Even when indigenous arms production in the Third World entails dependence 
on imported technology, it does reduce the vulnerability of the country to foreign 
pressures, particularly during a time of crisis, and enhances its freedom of maneuver.
But while the benefits associated with autarky are both numerous and diverse, this 
course of action also entails very high costs, which usually prove prohibitive for the 
small state:
— Arms production in a small state, particularly if it is accompanied by 
indigenous R&D, requires allocation of resources (capital and skilled labor) that in 
developing nations are usually rather scarce. Consequently, indigenous production may 
introduce severe distortions to the economy in general, and to civilian industry in 
particular.
— In managing their security dilemma, the most up-to-date weapons may make 
a crucial difference for small states, in deterrence as well as in combat operations. 
Resource constraints on indigenous arms production, however, may prohibit or at least 
delay the procurement of exactly these systems.
— The size of the domestic arms market in the small state makes the cost of 
production and procurement of weapon systems very high compared to their cost of 
similar systems mass produced abroad. Such high costs may thus force much smaller 
procurement programs than would otherwise be possible and desirable. Attempts to 
reduce costs of R&D and production by increasing production lines through exports not 
only face considerable difficulties in view of the stiff competition in the global market, 
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but, to the extent that they succeed, create foreign dependence, which the country was 
trying to avoid in the first place.
— Reducing the costs of indigenous production by importing technology is not 
easy to do (particularly with respect to the most sophisticated systems), and when done 
entails some dependence and is susceptible to cutoffs, etc.
To sum up, the benefits of type III and IV strategy are great, but the costs are 
overwhelming, and mounting, the closer a small state approximates autarky. Autarky, 
in the sense of complete independence of external help is, therefore, for all practical
A
purposes, an elusive goal for a small state that needs to maintain a modern well- 
equipped military force Still, the empirical evidence suggests that the resolve to free 
itself from the strings attached to arms transfers definitely pushes a small state farther 
toward autarky that would be justified on the basis of purely economic consideration. 
Table 5 shows quite clearly that since the 1960s developing small states have been 
moving at an ever-increasing pace toward indigenous production of major arms systems. 
Not only has the number of developing small states engaged in indigenous arms 
production grown dramatically since the 1960s, but many of these states have also
*
moved to higher stages of production (e.g. from maintenance and licensed production 
to independent R&D) and diversified the production to include a variety of naval, aerial, 
armor and missile systems.^0
*
The pattern of development of small state’s arms industries apears to be rather 
uniform both cross-nationally and for different weapons systems. Five distinct 
developmental stages have been identified. The first stage involves the assembly of 
arms under license. In the second stage the small states begin to produce weapon 
components under license. The third stage of domestic arms production involves 
production of complete weapons systems under license. In the fourth stage small states 
reproduce, through reverse engineering, or modify and redesign weapons systems. In 
the fifth and final stage, small states domestically design and produce weapons systems.
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Table 5 (continued)
Stages of Demonstrated Manufacturing Capabilities
1. Licensed Assembly
2. Licensed Component Production
3. Licensed System Production
4. System Modification/R everse Engineering
5. Dependent R&D and Production
5.5 Independent R&D and Production
P. Planned
Source: Andrew Ross, Arms Production in Developing Countries: the Proliferation of 
Conventional Weapons (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, N-1615-AF, October 
1981), pp. 16-19.
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B. Single Foreign Source (Strategy Type I)
Type I strategy involves total concentration on a single foreign supplier meeting 
all the arms needs of the small state . It, therefore, implies complete dependence. The 
small state had hardly any production or even assembly facilities to speak of, much less 
an indigenous military R&D capacity. Complete dependence nonetheless has some 
attractions for a small state, economic benefits being paramount:
— It is extremely efficient to maintain and operate a standardized modern 
military force (economies of standardization), which in today's world usually means 
purchasing the equipment from a single source. Standardization of military equipment 
also has clear operational advantages as it eases the logistical problems associated with 
maintenance of readiness as well as carrying out combat operations.
— Arms procurement from a single supplier may also have certain economic 
advantages, as the supplier may reward the customer with preferential treatment in the 
terms of the deals (delivery priority, prices, financing, etc.).
— The intimate political ties that frequently accompany arms supply 
relationship of a small state with a single foreign country are a potential source for 
"reverse influence." They may well commit the arms supplier to support his client well 
beyond what he would be inclined to do in the absence of such a relationship. One 
reason for this "reverse influence" is that the performance of the weapons supplied to 
the small state also affects the prestige of the producing country. There are 
considerable commercial, political and military benefits to be reaped from the 
successful demonstration of the efficacy of his weapons and there are analogous costs 
in case of their failure to perform adequately.
Still, the various benefits of maintaining a single foreign supplier of arms come at 
a high cost (actual and potential) to the small state:
— The weapons purchased from the foreign supplier will not be perfectly suited 
to the recipient country's conditions and needs, as usually they will not be tailored- 
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made to its requirements. This factor is bound to hamper the efficiency and reliability 
of these systems when in the small states use, resulting in indirect costs that can be 
very significant.
— It is very costly for a small state to alter established arms supply relations 
with a single foreign supplier. The process of switching suppliers is long, arduous, and 
potentially risky. It may entail considerable vulnerability in the transition period and 
impose high costs during both the transition period and after the process is completed 
(when the problem then becomes maintenance of disparate equipment in the arsenal). 
This state of affairs makes a small state, which is totally dependent on a single foreign 
arms supplier, susceptible to pressures to make political, military or economic 
concessions or face embargoes on spare parts and new systems.
— Viewed from the perspective of the small state, intimate military ties with a 
single foreign supplier may have certain undesirable side effects. In particular, the 
training of its military personnel in or by the supplying country is likely to provide that 
country with additional influence in the small state, influence that not desirable for the 
national interest of the latter.
All in all, it would seem that for a small state, complete dependence on a sole 
foreign arms supplier (Type I Strategy), while economically desirable and politically 
viable, is hardly desirable because of the political costs and risks involved. The 
empirical evidence suggests that small states share this view and actively seek to avoid 
complete reliance on a single foreign supplier if they can only help it.
As Table 6 demonstrates, the number of states that are completely dependent 
upon a single supplier has declined in recent years from twenty-eight to fourteen. This 
fifty percent decline in vulnerability dependence still may be a conservative estimate 
since the arms transfer figures used in this study (from ACDA) refer only to actual 
deliveries and not to orders or commitments. More recent data pertaining to orders and 
negotiations for the supply of arms indicate further strengthening of small states'
81efforts to reduce their dependence on single suppliers of arms.
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C. Diversification Among Foreign Suppliers (Type II Strategy)
The third major alternative in arms acquisition, one that is somewhere between 
autarky on the one hand, and complete dependence on the other, is diversification of 
the sources of weapon supply (via the spreading of military dependence over a number 
of supplying countries). This alternative may or may not include some indigenous arms 
production in the small state. Either way, it enhances the recipient state's freedom of 
action in a number of ways.
— The recipient country need not be overly concerned about military sanctions 
or threats thereof from any single supplier. By the same logic any one of the country's 
suppliers is less inclined to threaten or impose embargoes as they may not only be 
ineffective but also are likely to be counter-productive (completely eliminate his 
influence and market in the recipient country).
— The competition between arms producing countries enables the small state to 
play them one against the other and thus improve the terms of the arms deals it finally 
concludes.
— Diversification may prevent the development of a military elite "penetrated" 
by any one supplier country.
Diversification of sources of supply of arms, as attractive as it may seem to the 
small states, does not come without costs:
— It minimizes but does not eliminate the risks and consequences of cutoffs and 
the problems associated with them. Only one supplier needs to refuse to provide spare 
parts for some damage to be caused to the country's military preparedness.
— Maintenance of disparate systems in the weapon arsenal is more costly and 
cumbersome, and therefore may reduce the military preparedness in peace time and 
combat performance in war.
— Diversification cannot completely free the small state from the "addictive 
effects" of arms deals i.e. — "back-end problems." While the country may buy the arms
-47-
Table 6: Countries*  Highly Dependent (over 80%**)
***Considerable indigenous arms production capability.
Upon a Single Foreign Arms Supplier
1965-1974 1975-1979
Algeria Bulgaria
Australia Czechoslovakia
Bolivia Cuba
Bulgaria Ethiopia
Czechoslovakia GDR
Cuba
Egypt Israel
Ethiopia Jordan
Finland Korea (South)
GDR Laos
Greece Mali
Hungary Oman
Iraq Taiwan
Israel UAE
Korea (South) Uganda
Kuwait Yemen (Aden)
Laos Yugoslavia***
Mali
Phillipines 
Poland
Rumania
Somalia
Syria
Taiwan
Thailand
Turkey 
Yemen (Aden) 
Y ugoslavia
Source to Table 6: Prepared by the authors from ACDA data.
* Countries with insignificant arms imports (less than $20 million annually) were not 
included.
**ACDA's arms imports figures refer only to deliveries, not orders or commitments and 
exclude training, construction, and technical services.
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it desires from one of several suppliers, once the deal has been concluded it can usually 
get its spare parts only from the original supplier.
— Pursuing a conscious policy of purchasing weapons from several suppliers does 
not encourage any of them to give the recipient country preferential treatment, nor 
does it provide for any meaningful "reverse influence."
— Diversification policy may not be a viable strategic for every small state. 
Some "pariah" states may not be able to find more than one willing and able supplier.
With all the drawbacks of diversification counted, it still seems that a measure of 
diversification among foreign sources, coupled with some indigenous production, is the 
most attractive option for small states, as it reaps most of the benefits of strategies II 
and III, without incurring many of their costs. As was suggested above, the empirical 
evidence suggests that many countries indeed pursue this course of action (modified 
Type II/III strategy) by diminishing their dependence on a single foreign source (Table 6) 
and establishing indigenous arms industries (Table 5).
It should be noted that small states have one additional tactical alternative for 
managing their arms dependence: they can change their suppliers with relative ease in 
order to improve their bargaining position and avoid threatened or actual manipulation 
of their vulnerability. The empirical evidence suggests that in sharp contrast with the 
assumptions of the arms transfers literature, small states have indeed pursued this 
option (see Table 7.1 and 7.2), irrespective of the "addictive effects" of arms sales (i.e. 
"back-end" problems) and the other costs involved in making such changes.
3. Coercive Force
A third major condition for independence, according to Blau's scheme is coercive 
force. As Clausewitz already has made clear, "power is made up of two components,"
82the sum of available resources and the "strength of the will." The will of small states 
to use their resources for the purpose of sanctions is instrumental for exercise of 
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"reverse leverage" and for translating strategic resources into arms supply. The Saudi 
Arabian linkage of oil production (output and price) to arms sales in the recent 
negotiations on the sale of five AWACS planes is a case in point.
Still, applying coercive force to obtain arms is not a typical alternative for a 
small state. This is the case not only because some of these states do not possess any 
strategic resources that they could use coercively, but also because they are mostly 
inhibited from using their resources at the expense of the arms suppliers owing to
QQ
certain important "deterrent linkages." Theoretically the small states that have 
strategic resources at their disposal could use them for their advantage, and at the 
expense of the arms supplier, on any given issue. In practice, however, they must 
usually refrain from doing so for fear that if they push their advantages too far the
84 supplier can retaliate and thereby "wipe them out."
Thus, Turkey for example, in an apparent attempt to coerce the U.S. to lift the 
arms embargo imposed on Turkey in 1975, threatened to close permanently the 
American bases in Turkey and to withdraw from NATO ent’re’y But in practice the 
"deterrent linkages" discussed above prevented Turkey from "closing" more than five
85 out of the twenty-six U.S. bases. Even in the bases that were "closed," operations 
relating to NATO, and not purely to the U.S., were continued under "Turkish"
86command. It is striking, however, that in this case even limited action by Turkey 
proved effective in convincing the U.S. to lift its arms embargo.
Still, the fact that small states are mostly inhibited from using their strategic 
resources at the expense of the arms suppliers does not mean that small states cannot 
employ other means of coercion, since they can exploit favorable systemic conditions. 
Thus, for example, since both superpowers feel it is in their best military and political 
interests to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation, small states may try to exchange 
case, they can threaten to "go nuclear" if they fail to obtain conventional arsenals in 
restraint in the pursuit of the nuclear option for goods and services they desire. In this
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Table 7.1: Changes in Principal Foreign Arms Supplier 1965-1979.
(ACDA data base)
Country Old Supplier New Supplier
Argentina US Others**
Bangladesh USSR Others**
Brazil US OK
Chile UK Others**
Cyprus USSR Others*  *
Denmark US FRG
Egypt* USSR France
Ecuador US France
Ethiopia* US USSR
Finland USSR Others**
Kuwait UK US
Laos* US USSR
Libya* France USSR
Morocco US France
Mexico US UK
N icaragua US Others**
Peru* Canada USSR
Singapore UK US
Sudan* USSR FRG
Tanzania China USSR
Tunisia US Others*  ♦
Source: Prepared by the authors from U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 
World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1970-1979 and 1965-1974.
* Block Changes
**This category does not include major suppliers such as U.S., USSR, France, UK, FRG, 
Italy, Poland, Canada.
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Table 7.2: Other Changes in Principal Arms Suppliers 1965-1981
Country Old Supplier New Supplier
Cambodia United States China
Congo France USSR
Israel France US
North Yemen USSR US
Somalia USSR Others
Sources: Michael Mihalka, "Supplier-Client Patterns in Arms Transfers: The Developing 
Countries 1967-76" in Stephanie G. Neuman and Robert E. Harkary, (eds.), Arms 
Transfers in the Modern World, (New York: Praeger, 1979), p. 73. Also data collected by 
the authors.
-52-
87 sufficient quality and quantity to address their sources of insecurity. For the threat 
to be credible, however, some actual or potential nuclear capability is a condition sine 
qua non.
This logic may explain, in part, why Israel has never denied its capability to 
produce nuclear weapons. M. Handel claims that Israel's ambiguous nuclear weapons 
policy aims in part at ". . . the improvement of its bargaining position in purchasing
OO 
weapons from a reluctant power interested in non-proliferation." According to 
Handel, in 1966 Israel agreed to allow inspection of its nuclear reactor in Dimona, 
apparently in exchange for an American agreement to supply Israel with A-4 
89airplanes. Handel and others suggested that Israel actually used the threat of a 
nuclear strike against the Arabs during the 1973 war in an attempt to pressure the U.S.
90to launch an airlift of military supplies to Israel. Statements by Turkish politicians
91 during the period of U.S. embargo that Turkey might go nuclear could be interpreted 
in the same light, although Turkey at the time lacked the actual technological base to 
realize the threat within a short period. It would seem that Pakistan and Taiwan, and 
perhaps even South Africa are currently using the same threat to go nuclear in order to 
obtain conventional weapons, and are doing so with far greater credibility.
The linkage between the production of nuclear weapons and the supply of 
conventional ones, and the kind of bargaining position it provides the small state has 
been most explicit in the context of American-Pakistani relations. President Zia ul- 
Haq has publicly committed himself to refrain from producing nuclear weapons in 
return for a massive American aid package. The U.S. has agreed to provide Pakistan 
with a 3.2 billion dollar in aid, including, among other things, 40 ultra-modern F-16 
fighter-bombers. The U.S. Department of Defense nonetheless tried to equip the 
Pakistani planes with somewhat inferior electronic counter-measures (ALA-46 (v)-3) 
than those available in their American counterparts (ALR-69), reasoning that "the U.S. 
will not risk its most advanced technology when there is no need to do so." The
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Pakistanis, however, felt so confident of their bargaining position that in November 
1982 they refused to take delivery of the F-16s unless they were equipped with the most 
sophisticated electronic countermeasures, and the U.S. quickly gave in to the Pakistani 
demands.^
4. Ideals Lessening Needs
Absence of any need for weapons constitutes an alternative to compliance and a 
fourth condition for independence. As we have already noted, however, defense 
nihilism is not a realistic option for most small states for a variety of military and 
political reasons. The question, therefore, arises, what viable alternatives do exist for 
small states to defend themselves against an external attack with the minimum of 
foreign dependence. Blau's idea of ideas lessening need is an obvious solution. It may 
be interpreted here to mean adoption of a military doctrine that places as little 
emphasis as possible on external assistance in matters of national security.
A strategy of dissuasion through denial seems particularly well suited for the 
purpose of reducing the dependence of small states on foreign powers in security 
matters. This strategy, unlike strategies emphasizing punishment or disarming attacks 
(pre-emption), does not call for the use of large military units and/or complex ultra­
sophisticated equipment. While the denial strategy also permits the use of certain large 
and sophisticated weapon systems (e.g. air-defense systems, terrain denying weaponry), 
these systems do not play a key role in the strategy. As Horst Mendershausen puts it:
"in the configuration of the whole effort small units of weaponry play 
relatively important roles, weapons that can be widely distributed 
among home defense forces, that can be employed by the defense 
forces without causing indiscriminate devastation, that can be 
maintained and replenished by recourse to the resources of domestic 
society. The development and refinement of weapons of this kind 
may be called the work of Small Technology, not small in the sense of 
primitive, but in the sense of being more on the human scale."95
•r>
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Certain new technologies such as Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs) permit the 
substitution of technology for manpower, as well as the substitution of cheaper 
defensive weapons for large numbers of expensive tanks and aircraft. Thus, they seem 
to have the potential of providing a small state with adequate security while drawing on 
fewer large complex and expensive weapon systems, thereby enhancing their 
independence. Moreover, by permitting substitution of technlogy for manpower these 
systems also make it possible to rely on more domestic sources and fewer imported 
ones. Typical examples of the use of this kind of strategy are provided by countries like 
97Sweden, Yugoslavia, Norway, Switzerland etc.
Balance Sheet
Our analysis of unit level conditions in this section strongly reinforces the 
conclusions of the preceding section (which examined systemic conditions) regarding the 
leverage that suppliers may derive from arms transfers to small states. It does so by 
pointing out that small states possess three viable strategies for reducing their overall 
vulnerability to economic coercion stemming from their dependence on foreign sources 
of arms for leverage purposes. First, they may change their military strategy to one 
requiring fewer modern and sophisticated weapons, thereby diminishing their overall 
degree of dependence. Second, they may use the strategic resources at their disposal to 
lure arms suppliers, thus reducing the asymmetry in their dependence by creating more 
interdependent relations with their arms suppliers. A third possible strategy for small 
states is to pursue policies of diversification of foreign suppliers and indigenous arms 
production. The latter two policies do not eliminate the dependence on foreign sources, 
they only change its form from vulnerability to sensitivity dependence. Let us 
elaborate this last point.
Diversification of foreign arms sources does not eliminate the overall degree of 
dependence on foreign arms sources, it merely spreads the dependence over a large 
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number of suppliers. This, in turn, reduces the likelihood that any one of the small 
state's arms suppliers can gain, by himself, sufficient control over supply to manipulate 
the dependence in a meaningful way. Since several independent suppliers are usually 
willing and able to provide most small states with the weapons they desire, and 
cooperation of all the relevant suppliers in sanctions against a small state is hard to 
come by, diversification is a viable and quite effective strategy for reducing 
vulnerability in a relatively short time. Indigenous arms production, on the other hand, 
is necessarily a longer term strategy for reducing any vulnerability dependence.88 
Again, it does so not by eliminating foreign dependence but by changing its form, this 
time by spreading dependence over time. It substitutes dependence on imported 
complete weapon systems and spare parts with dependence on imported technology and 
components, thereby also replacing short-term vulnerability to coercive leverage by 
long-term sensitivity. This latter form of dependence is much less constraining for 
small states' freedom of action.
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Vin. THE EFFICACY OF ARMS EMBARGOES
Even when systemic and unit conditions do not favor the exercise of leverage by 
arms suppliers over their small state recipients, the former may still enjoy very 
significant leverage over the latter through perceptual mechanisms. Specifically, 
apprehensions and misperceptions of small states about the consequences of arms 
cutoffs may lead them to comply with the will of the supplier through anticipation even 
when the supplier makes no attempt to apply coercion.99 Since such apprehensions and 
misperceptions can be deeply rooted, they may not be immediately affected by changes 
in the external environment. 1" Over the long run, however, they are more than likely 
to change when confronted repeatedly with conclusive contradictory evidence. Thus, if 
it could be conclusively demonstrated that repeated incidents of economic coercion, 
including arms embargoes have largely been ineffective and have only inflicted limited 
cost on small states, misperceptions on the issue will become less likely as times goes 
on, undermining in the process also this source of leverage. Let us, therefore, turn to 
consider the past track record of economic coercion attempts in general, and arms 
embargoes in particular.
The use of economic warfare in the form of trade embargoes, blockades and other 
types of sanction in the post World War II era, has been quite widespread in relations 
between smaller and greater powers as well as between the superpowers. Much has 
been written to explain this frequent resort to economic warfare. Most of the 
literature on the topic points to the expansion of global trade and to the di munition in 
the utility of military force and the rise in the cost of its applications (in relations 
between the major powers and between the major powers and the smaller ones, if not 
between the smaller ones themselves) as creating both the conditions and the 
motivation to employ economic warfare to advance ones' interests.101 The relative
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inexpensiveness of trade sanctions (at least in terms of human lives) has increased their 
attractiveness in the eyes of the policy makers.
Whatever the reasons for the popularity of economic warfare among policy 
makers, one thing is abundantly clear—the frequency of its use should not be construed 
as an indicator of its effectiveness as an instrument of foreign policy. Economic 
warfare is practiced for a whole array of reasons ranging from the desire to modify 
behavior of a target state to the need to appease domestic and foreign constituencies, 
or enhance political support of the leadership. Only part of these reasons are related to 
foreign policy. Furthermore, the efficacy of economic coercion as a tool of foreign 
policy is critically dependent on the capacity of the sender state (by itself, or in 
cooperation with others) to control the supply (embargo) and/or demand (boycott) in the 
market for one or more good or service that is vital to the target state. But such 
control over the market is extremely hard to attain in most cases. In many cases, 
therefore, the sender state does not expect to attain and exercise such control, in 
others it does not even intend to do so, and in still others it both intends and attempts 
but fails. Consequently, the overall success record of economic coercion, when 
measured in terms of the actual impact on the flow of goods or services to or from a 
target country, has been rather dismal.
Economic coercion in the specific context of arms transfers to small states has 
not fared much better. Despite the nature of the demand for arms, their strategic 
importance and unique features as a commodity (creating "addictive effects"), and the 
presumed oligopolistic structure of the global arms market, arms embargoes have 
largely failed and in more than one respect. First, and probably most fundamental, 
arms embargoes have failed to curtail or severely interrupt supply of arms and spare 
parts to the target states even when this indeed was the goal of the embargo. This 
pattern holds true even for embargoes that were imposed on "pariah states" like South 
Africa, Rhodesia, Chile and Israel. In recent years only Chile has encountered 
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considerable difficulties because of an arms embargo in obtaining the weapons it 
desired. But even it now seems to have overcome these problems without a noticable 
change in the policy that brought about the embargo in the first place. This failure of 
arms embargoes to affect the supply of weapons to the target states can be directly 
attributed to the lack of cooperation with the embargoes from all the major arms 
suppliers, as well as the lack of support for them within these supplying countries. The 
strong determination of small states to free themselves from vulnerability in this area, 
mainly through diversification of foreign sources and indigenous production, has also 
contributed its share to the failure of these embargoes.
Arms embargoes have proven unsuccessful in one additional respect. They have 
largely been ineffective in bringing about a desired change in policy in the target state. 
While it is, no doubt, difficult to establish a causal link between an arms embargo (or 
any other trade sanction for that matter) and a change in policy in the target state, an 
absence of such change is a clear indication of the ineffectiveness of the embargo, and 
this has more often that not been the case. Moreover, some arms embargoes have not 
merely failed but in some cases may have even backfired in a variety of ways e.g., by 
consolidating the public support behind the government of the target state, pushing it 
toward greater intransigence and entrenchment and even accentuating its unfavorable 
policies toward the sender state, as an assertion of national sovereignty. The American 
arms embargo against Turkey (1974-78), and the Turkish reprisals in closing some 
American military bases without modifying their policies in Cyprus are one example. It 
should be noted that all of these repercussions of embargoes for the sender state do not 
even take into consideration the other types of costs it is likely to incur due to its 
action (the imposition of the embargo), such as loss of revenues and reputation for 
reliability as supplier.
The confidence in these conclusions regarding the inefficacy of arms embargoes is 
reinforced when they are put to a difficult test, namely when they are found to hold 
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true even for cases where the conditions were most unfavorable for such an outcome. 
Specifically, arms embargoes have failed even in circumstances in which they would be 
expected to succeed, namely, when the countries subjected to an arms embargo were 
engaged in combat and war, a time when the demand for spare parts and additional 
weapons is greatest and the vulnerability to an arms embargo is consequently the 
highest. The failures of the French arms embargo on Israel in 1967, and the American 
and European embargoes on Iran in 1980-81 and Argentina in 1982 are particularly 
instructive in this respect. The dismal success record of past embargoes, coupled with 
the global proliferation of weapons, spare parts, and production facilities, thus give us a 
strong reason to believe that in the foreseeable future, arms embargoes will be a highly 
ineffective tool of diplomacy in all but the most exceptional circumstances. Moreover, 
the failure of past embargoes goes a long way toward undermining the credibility and, 
therefore, also the impact of any threats of future embargoes, which in turn may well 
deter arms suppliers from using them in the first place.
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IX. CONCLUSIONS
It is common knowledge that arms transfers to small states are motivated to no 
small degree by the desire of the supplier to gain influence and leverage over the 
recipient. Whether arms transfers indeed succeed in attaining this goal, however, is 
still very much of an open question, for in this area, like so many others, numerous 
complex and incompletely understood factors, many of them beyond the control of the 
supplier, govern the translation of intent into reality. A review of the literature 
relevant to arms transfers on leverage has revealed two schools of thought, with 
coherent but seemingly contradictory answers to the above question. One school of 
thought, traditionally paramount in the arms transfer literature, suggesting that arms 
transfers to small states indeed provide leverage to the supplier(s). The other school of 
thought, one that dominates the economic coercion literature, providing strong reasons 
to doubt that this is actually the case.
To analyze the competing claims of the two schools of thought we have looked in 
some detail at the factors that affect the translation of arms imports into meaningful 
dependence leverage. We first introduced a framework for analysis borrowed from 
sociology (social exchange theory), then proceeded to examine in its light the pertinent 
theoretical considerations and empirical evidence on several levels of analysis. In 
following this procedure we both deviated from and complemented most previous 
studies of the leverage issue, which have largely addressed it inductively through 
analysis of the motivation for, and consequences of, specific historical instances of 
arms transfers.
Our analysis points out rather conclusively that over the last two decades 
profound changes have taken place in the global arms market as well as in the 
conditions within both arms supplying and receiving nations, and consequently also in 
the relationship between the former and the latter. As a result of these changes the 
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conditions prevailing in today's world hardly seem conducive for deriving leverage from 
arms transfers to small states.102 The deeply ingrained motivation of small states to 
resist coercive pressures of foreign powers can therefore manifest itself, without 
incurring prohibitive costs, in actual defiance of the will of the arms suppliers. Under 
such conditions defiant behavior by small states is not only possible but even probable, 
particularly when one considers the dismal success record of past embargoes. This 
record of failure diminishes even the possibility that arms suppliers would enjoy 
leverage through cognitive-perceptual factors, namely through apprehension and 
anticipation of arms embargoes. We hasten to add, however, that significant variation 
does exist between small states with respect to variables relevant to leverage and 
defiance. A definitive answer on the vulnerability of each individual small state to 
coercive leverage of its arms supplier(s) and any prediction of behavior in this context 
must take account of the particular circumstances of the nation involved.
Based on the analysis carried out in this paper we can also conclude, with some 
confidence, that the economic coercion literature provides much better insight into the 
leverage emanating from arms sales than the writings on arms transfer. Here, however, 
some caveats are in order. First, the arms transfers literature concerns itself not only 
with leverage but also with other forms of influence produced by arms transfers to 
small states. Only the leverage issue, however, has been systematically analyzed in this 
paper, and our conclusions should not therefore be construed as providing a definitive 
answer on the other issues as well. Second, while we consider the traditional literature 
on arms transfers to small states highly inaccurate and even misleading on the leverage 
issue, we do not mean to dismiss it as either irrelevant or useless. We would, however, 
argue that the arms transfer literature, while dynamic on the descriptive level, has 
been rather static on the theoretical one, failing to evaluate systematically the 
implications for the leverage issue of many developments it has so perceptively 
observed. Had these writers done so, they would have, no doubt, reached different 
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conclusions on the issue, and the conclusions of some modest attempts that have 
103recently proceeded in this direction indeed demonstrate the point.
Finally, we believe that our paper can contribute to better understanding among 
policy makers, of the leverage that can be derived from arms transfers to small states. 
This would hopefully lead to more realistic appreciation of the limitations of arms 
embargoes among the arms suppliers and consequently lead to more selective use of this 
instrument of diplomacy as well as to seriously challenge the leverage rationale for 
arms sales. As for the small states, they can possibly find a reassuring message in our 
conclusion, namely, that they need not be overly concerned about the political 
repercussions of arms dependence on foreign sources, provided they are willing to 
implement some modestly precautionary measures. They can probably interpret our 
conclusions to mean that they may pursue domestic and foreign policies that are 
essentially independent of their arms suppliers.
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